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Note
Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa:
A Constitutional Possibility
Mary PatriciaByrn*

On December 10, 1996, South Africa's President, Nelson
Mandela, signed into law what has been called the world's most
enlightened constitution.'
The South African Constitution
includes a Bill of Rights that arguably protects more
2
fundamental rights than any other constitution in the world.
In addition, South Africa was the first country specifically to
3
outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Using this constitutional provision, the South African
Constitutional Court 4 has granted gays and lesbians significant

* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1991,
Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL. The author would like to thank
Professor Dale Carpenter and Professor Pierre de Vos who provided advice
integral to the development of this Note. Hansem (Dawn) Kim and Rebecca
Bernhard provided helpful comments and suggestions. The author would like
to thank the members of the Minnesota Law Review and, especially, Katherine
M. Byrn.
1. Albie Sachs, South Africa's Unconstitutional Constitution: The
Transition from Power to Lawful Power, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1249, 1257
(1997).

2. Makua wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The
Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 n.9 (1997). The Bill
of Rights prohibits discrimination on almost every conceivable ground
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
color, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, birth, and
sexual orientation. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
3. Craig Lind, Politics, PartnershipRights and the Constitution in South
Africa... (and the Problems of Sexual Identity), in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS:
A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 279, 279 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes. eds.,
2001).

4. "The Constitutional Court - (a) is the highest court in all
constitutional matters; (b) may decide only constitutional matters, and issues
connected with decisions on constitutional matters; and (c) makes the final
decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is
connected with a decision on a constitutional matter." S.AFR. CONST. ch. 8, §
167(3). See Richard J. Goldstone, The South African Bill of Rights, 32 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 451, 458-59 (1997) (describing the role of the Constitutional Court
and judicial review under the new Constitution).
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victories in cases regarding sodomy, 5 immigration, 6 spousal
benefits, 7 and adoption. 8 The next step in granting gays and
lesbians full substantive rights under the South African
Constitution is to grant homosexuals the right to legally marry.
A case challenging the constitutionality of the ban on
same-sex marriage9 under South Africa's Constitution was
argued before the Pretoria High Court on October 15, 2002.10
When this issue is appealed to the Constitutional Court,"

5. See Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice,
1999 (1) SALR 6, 44 (CC) (holding that the common law and statutory crimes
of sodomy and unnatural sex acts were unconstitutional). For a discussion of
the case and the Court's analysis see infra Part II.A.
6. See Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home
Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1, 47 (CC) (holding that section 25(5) of the Aliens
Control Act of 1991 was unconstitutional because it facilitated the
immigration of spouses of permanent South African residents, but did not
afford the same benefits to same-sex life partners). For a discussion of the
case and the Court's analysis see infra Part II.B.
7. See Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa, No. CCT
45/01,
23 (CC July 25, 2002), http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2002/
satchwell.pdf (holding that sections 8 and 9 of the Judge's Remuneration and
Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 were unconstitutional because the
provisions afforded benefits to spouses but not to same-sex partners with
substantially similar relationships). For a discussion of the case and the
Court's analysis see infra Part II.C.
8. Du Toit v. Minister of Welfare and Population Dev., No. CCT 40/01,
25-26 (CC Sept. 10, 2002), http://www.concourt.gov.zajudgments/2002/
dutoit.pdf (holding that sections 17(a) and (c) of the Child Care Act were
unconstitutional because the provisions unfairly discriminate between
applicants that are married and same-sex couples). The opinion in this case is
not analyzed in this Note because the decision came down after submission for
publication.
9. For a discussion of the common law ban on same-sex marriage in
South Africa see infra Part III.
10. Nicolize Mulder, Lesbidrs se Trou-aansoek Uitgestel, BEELD, August 5,
2002, http://152.111.1.42/argiewe/beeld.html (on file with author). The High
Court judge dismissed the lesbian couple's application to get married because
the "matter was of a constitutional nature and U he was not prepared to
exercise his own discretion." The couple intends to appeal. Lesbian and Gay
Equality Project, South Africa Dismisses Marriage Case, at http://www.
equality.org/news/2002/10/20marry.htm (on file with author). The opinion in
this case is not analyzed in this Note because the decision came down after
submission for publication.
11. The Constitutional Court is the highest court in South Africa for all
constitutional matters and, therefore, will be the final arbiter of a case arguing
for same-sex marriage. Information about the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, at http://www.concourt.gov.za/about.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2002).
Anyone wishing to bring a constitutional case before the Constitutional Court
must usually start in the High Court. The High Court has the power to award
relief including the invalidation of legislation. The Constitutional Court,
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whether in this case or under a future challenge to the
marriage law, the Court 12 will have the opportunity to
recognize same-sex marriage as an explicit constitutional right.
Based on the historical, textual, and precedential arguments
favoring gays and lesbians in South Africa, this Note argues
that the Constitutional Court must find the ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional.
Section I of this Note will discuss some of the key
provisions of the South African Bill of Rights that will effect the
Court's consideration of same-sex marriage. Gays and lesbians
in South Africa have strong textual arguments for the
recognition of same-sex marriage based on the explicit
language in the Constitution protecting sexual orientation.
Section II will review the development of the Constitutional
Court's Bill of Rights jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court
has addressed sodomy, immigration, spousal benefits, and
adoption under the sexual orientation provision and has
outlined a clear analytical framework under the right to
equality. Section III will consider same-sex marriage within
the framework of the South African Constitution and the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court to determine how the
Court should resolve the issue of whether same-sex marriage
should be recognized as a constitutional right. This section will
consider the textual and precedential arguments for same-sex
marriage, as well as some of the social arguments against
recognizing full marriage rights for gays and lesbians. This
Note concludes that denying homosexual couples the right to
marry is unconstitutional under the South African
Constitution.
I. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
South Africa's Constitution was written in response to the
incredible injustices suffered by a majority of South Africans
under Apartheid. 13 The extreme oppression experienced during
however, must confirm an order for invalidity before it has any effect. If the
High Court does not award relief, the case can be appealed to the
Constitutional Court, but the Constitutional Court is not required to hear the
case. Id.
12. Use of the word "Court" in this Note will refer to the South African
Constitutional Court. References to any other court will include the full name,
e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court.
13. Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into
South Africa's Journey Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463,
479-80 (noting that "Iflor the first time ever, South Africa has a constitution
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Apartheid crystallized the anti-discrimination sentiment in
South Africa and resulted in a Constitution that refuses to
tolerate discrimination on almost any level. 14 The antidiscriminatory purpose and explicit textual provisions of the
South African Constitution provide strong arguments in favor
of recognizing same-sex marriage as a fundamental right.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE

The preamble to the Constitution states that one of the
purposes of the Constitution is to "[h]eal the divisions of the
past and establish a society based on democratic values, social
justice and fundamental human rights." 15 In President of the
Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, the Court stated that
the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded
equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership [in]
particular groups. The achievement of such a society in the context of
our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that that is the goal
of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.' 6

In an attempt to reach this goal, the drafters made
equality the fundamental value of the Constitution. 17 When
which guarantees that all people have equal rights"). In 1948, after gaining
control of the South African Parliament in all-white elections, the National
Party (NP) began formalizing Apartheid as the official ideology of the South
African government. Id. at 470-71. The NP believed that the only way to
secure white dominance was through the separation of the races and passed
laws that required everyone to be classified according to their race, proscribed
interracial sex and marriage, segregated racial groups in different areas, and
required segregation of public facilities. Id.
14. Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution
From a Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 68 (1999). By the
late 1980s, the increasing violence within South Africa and the mounting
international economic pressure to end Apartheid pushed then President F.W.
de Klerk to lift the ban on opposition political parties, release hundreds of
political prisoners, and announce his commitment to a negotiated political
settlement and the creation of a bill of fundamental rights. RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM:

THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 131 (Dawid

van Wyk et al. eds., 1994). The opposition political parties, led by the African
National Congress (ANC), were also firmly committed to forming a nation
based on human rights. The ANC first embodied the principle elements of a
Bill of Rights in its Freedom Charter in 1955. Goldstone, supra note 4, at 452.
The ANC later concretized this goal in a working draft of a Bill of Rights in
1992. Mutua, supra note 2, at 77.
15. S.AFR. CONST. pmbl.
16. No. CCT 11/96, 41 (CC Apr. 18, 1997), http://www.concourt.gov.za/
judgments/1997/hugo.pdf.
17.

See JOHAN DE WAAL ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 153

(1998) (noting that a comprehensive textual commitment to equality was
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interpreting the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Court has
stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that the guarantee of
equality lies at the very heart of the Constitution. It permeates
and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is
premised." 18 This Constitutional goal of equal dignity and
respect for all is central to the argument for same-sex
marriage.
B. THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY

The first right specifically outlined in the South African
Bill of Rights is the right to equality. 19 At the center of this
provision is the principle of anti-discrimination based on unfair
discrimination. 20 In order for a constitutional challenge based
on the equality provision to succeed, there must be more than a
general claim to equality. 2' Instead, the claimant will need to
frame the matter as one of unfair discrimination. 22 In this way,
the Court has refused to focus only on the issues of sameness
essential to creating a new legal and political order in light of South Africa's
history of state-sanctioned inequality).
18. Fraser v. Children's Court, No. CCT 31/96,
20 (CC Feb. 5, 1997),
http://www.concourt.za/judgments/1997/fraser.pdf (holding that the provision
in the Child Care Act of 1983 dispensing with the need to obtain a father's
consent for the adoption of his illegitimate child violated the father's
constitutional right to equality).
19. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9. The equality provision provides as follows:
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language, and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair
discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds in subsection (3) is
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
Id. (emphasis added).
20. See Pierre de Vos, Sexual Orientation and the Right to Equality in the
South African Constitution: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
& Another v. Minister of Justice & Others, 117 S. AFR. L.J. 17, 18-19 (2000).
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id.
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and similar treatment, 23 but instead "examine[s] the actual
economic, social, and political conditions of groups and
individuals in order to determine whether the Constitution's
commitment to equality is being upheld."24 In other words,
rather than looking merely at the form of the discrimination,
the Court will look at the actual discrimination and its impact
on the disfavored group. 25 In addition, the Court looks not only
at the past effects of the discrimination, but at its future impact
as well.

26

The Constitutional Court has outlined a multi-stage
analysis when considering the equality provision in the Bill of
Rights. 27 The Court initially asks whether the provision
differentiates between people or categories of people. 28 Second,
the Court asks if the differentiation amounts to
discrimination. 29 If the differentiation is based on one of the
grounds listed in the equality provision, such as sexual
30
orientation, then discrimination will have been established.
23. Id. (noting that the Constitutional Court's substantive approach to
equality takes into consideration the lingering effects of past discrimination
rather than operating on the assumption that legal equality will result in
social equality).
24. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 155.
25. Id.
26. See Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice,
1999 (1) SALR 6, 38-39 (CC). The Court stated the following:
It is insufficient for the Constitution merely to ensure, through its
Bill of Rights, that statutory provisions that have caused such unfair
discrimination in the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination
frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of
which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are
eliminated, and unless remedied, may continue for a substantial time
and even indefinitely. Like justice, equality delayed is equality
denied.
Id.
27. See, e.g., id. at 22-25 (holding that the common law and statutory law
crimes of sodomy violated the rights to equality, privacy, and human dignity);
Prinsloo v. Van der Linde, No. CCT 4/96,
15-34 (CC Apr. 18, 1997),
http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/1997/prinsloo.pdf
(holding that the
Forest Act's presumption of negligence in certain circumstances did not violate
the defendant's right to equality); President of the Republic of South Africa v.
Hugo, No. CCT 11/96, J 33 (CC Apr. 18, 1997), http://www.concourt.gov.za/
judgments/1997/hugo.pdf (holding that a Presidential pardon of mothers in
prison with minor children under the age of twelve did not unfairly
discriminate against fathers in prison with minor children).
28. Hugo, No. CCT 11/96, % 33, http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/
1997/hugo.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id. If the differentiation is not on a specified ground, then whether or
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Finally, if the differentiation amounts to discrimination, the
Court will ask whether the discrimination is unfair. 31 If the
discrimination is on one of the grounds listed, unfairness will
be presumed unless it is established that the discrimination is
32
fair.
C. THE RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY
The Bill of Rights also contains provisions protecting the
rights to privacy and human dignity. The privacy provision
states that "[e]veryone has the right to privacy." 33 This
includes a person's right to be left alone, as well as to seek selfrealization and fulfillment. 34 In Bernstein v. Bester NO, the
Constitutional Court described the right to privacy as being
closely related to the concept of identity. 35 The Court stated
that the right to privacy includes the "right to establish and
maintain relations with other human beings for the fulfillment
of one's personality." 36 The right to privacy, therefore, protects
not only one's right to physical space, such as one's body or
home; it also protects private decisions, such as whether to
37
have sexual relations with someone or not.
The constitutional provision protecting human dignity
states that "[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to
have their dignity respected and protected."38 The right to

not there is discrimination will depend on whether the differentiation "is
based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the
fundamental dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in
a comparably serious manner." Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v.
Minister of Justice, (1) SALR at 24.
31. See Hugo, No. CCT 11/96, 33, http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/
1997/hugo.pdf.
32. Id. This case also serves as an example of a situation where the
Constitutional Court held that discrimination on the basis of sex was fair. See
id. 47 (holding that pardoning female prisoners with young children, but not
male prisoners with young children, did not amount to unfair discrimination).
If the discrimination is on an unspecified ground, then the complainant
will have to establish unfairness. The test for unfairness focuses on the
impact of the discrimination on the complainant or members of the affected
group. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, (1)
SALR at 24.
33. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 14.
34. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 212-13.
35. 1996 (2) SALR 751, 788 (CC).
36. Id. at 791 (citations omitted).
37. DE WAAL ET AL., supra note 17, at 213.
38. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 10.
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human dignity is a preeminent value in the Constitution 39 and
is listed in the Constitution as one of the founding values of
South Africa. 40 The right to human dignity implies respect for
all of a person's rights and the impairment of dignity will
constitute a critical test of whether another fundamental right
41
has been violated.
D. THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS

If any of the rights protected in the Bill of Rights are
infringed, the government can still argue that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable pursuant to section 36 of the
Constitution. 42 This provision requires a court to determine
whether a limitation has a reasonable purpose and is achieved
through reasonable means by considering the proportionality
between the limitation's effect and its objectives. 43 This
analysis involves determining the relationship between the
right being limited and the creation of a democracy based on
human dignity, equality, and freedom.4 4 Thus, "the closer the
relationship the less generous should the court be in its
45
decision to uphold a limitation of such right."
E. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

The last section of the Bill of Rights provides guidelines as
39.

DENNIS DAVIS ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 70

(Dennis Davis et al. eds., 1997).
40. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 1.
41. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 39, at 74-75.
42. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36. This section states:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors
including -

(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of
the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of

Rights.
Id.
43. See Goldstone, supra note 4, at 461-62 (discussing this dual test for
reasonableness).
44. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 39, at 319.
45. Id.
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to the approach courts should take when interpreting the Bill of
Rights. 46 This section promotes a purposive approach to
constitutional interpretation. 47 Such an approach requires
courts to go beyond the words of the text to employ a "valueoriented interpretive theory."48 The Constitutional Court
confirmed this understanding in two 1995 cases when it held
that individual provisions should be construed in the context of
the overall purpose of the Constitution and in reference to
49
other fundamental rights.
Section 39 also provides that "international agreements...
and international customary law are binding law unless they
contradict the Constitution or other laws passed by
Parliament" 50 and that the Court may consider foreign law. 51
The Constitutional Court has stated, however, that cases
decided in other countries will not necessarily provide clear
resolutions to issues involving the interpretation of the South
African Bill of Rights.5 2 Various statements from the Court
have warned against the use of foreign law because of the
"different contexts within which other constitutions were
drafted, the different social structures and milieu existing in
those countries as compared with those in this country, and the
46. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39. This section states:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.

Id.
47.

See Goldstone, supra note 4, at 459 (referring to section 35 of the

interim Constitution). The corresponding provision to section 35 in the final
Constitution is section 39. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 39, at 334; Goldstone,
supra note 4, at 459 n.32.
48. Brian Currin and Johan Kruger, The Protection of Fundamental
Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993: A Brief
Contextualization,in INTERPRETING A BILL OF RIGHTS 132, 133 (Johan Kruger
& Brian Currin eds., 1994).
49. See State v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867, 874 (CC) (stating that

courts

should interpret laws "with regard

Constitution");

State v. Makwanyane,

1995 (3)

to the

objectives of the

SALR 391, 403-04 (CC)

(indicating that provisions of the Constitution should be considered in relation
to the entire Constitution and the rights it encompasses).
50. Mutua, supra note 2, at 66.
51. S.AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39.
52. Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the
Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights and Interpretationof Human Rights
Provisions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 197 (1998).
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different historical backgrounds against which the various
53
constitutions came into being."
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE
REGARDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Constitutional Court has decided four cases to date in
which it interpreted the sexual-orientation provision in the
Constitution. 54 These cases were overwhelming victories for
gays and lesbians and present strong precedential arguments
favoring the recognition of same-sex marriage. In addition, the
Court touched on the issue of same-sex marriage in all four
cases, sometimes even appearing to go out of its way to light
the path for the recognition of same-sex marriage.

53. Id. (quoting Park-Ross v. Director, Office of Serious Economic
Offenses, 1995 (2) SALR 148, 160 (CC)); see also Richard Cameron Blake, The
Frequent Irrelevance of US JudicialDecisions in South Africa, 15 S.AFR.J. ON
HUM. RTS. 192, 197 (1999). The Court has stated the following:
The Constitutional Court has examined many cases from a number of
foreign countries. The court will have regard for authorities from a
foreign country, but if there are significant differences between that
country and the South African 'legal system, our history and
circumstances, and the structure and language of our own
Constitution,' it does not feel obligated to follow those authorities. In
particular, the Court does not appreciate advocates throwing out
numerous foreign authorities in support of arguments without
explaining their application in the South African context. Finally, the
Court looks first to principles and doctrines it has established in its
previous cases and uses foreign decisions 'particularly where
principles have not yet been established.'
Id. (citations omitted).
54. See Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice,
1999 (1) SALR 6, 44 (CC) (holding that the common law and statutory crimes
of sodomy and unnatural sex acts were unconstitutional); Nat'l Coalition for
Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1, 47 (CC)
(holding that section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act of 1991 was
unconstitutional because it facilitated the immigration of spouses of
permanent South African residents, but did not afford the same benefits to
same-sex life partners); Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, No.
CCT 45/01,
23 (CC July 25, 2002), http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/
2002/satchwell.pdf. (holding that sections 8 and 9 of the Judge's Remuneration
and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 were unconstitutional because
the provisions afforded benefits to spouses but not to same-sex partners with
substantially similar relationships); Du Toit v. Minister of Welfare and
Population Dev., No. CCT 40/01, IT 25-26 (CC Sept. 10, 2002),
http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2002/dutoit.pdf (holding that sections
17(a) and (c) of the Child Care Act were unconstitutional because the
provisions unfairly discriminate between applicants that are married and
same-sex couples). The opinion in the Adoption Case is not analyzed in this
Note because the decision came down after submission for publication.
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A. THE SODOMY CASE

In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.

Minister of Justice,55 the Constitutional Court affirmed a High

Court decision holding that various common law and statutory
crimes of sodomy and unnatural sex acts 56 were
unconstitutional based on the rights to equality, privacy, and
human dignity. 57 The Court's decision can be considered a
unanimous judgment that "clearly enunciated the court's view
on homosexuality and sexual identity in the light of the
58
equality guarantee in the Constitution."
The Court began by framing its analysis in terms of the
purpose of the equality provision to prohibit patterns of group
disadvantage and harm.5 9 The Court then defined sexual
orientation not as a sexual act, but as a matter of "sexual

55. The complainants were the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality and the South African Human Rights Commission. The Coalition
was a "voluntary association of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered
people in South Africa and of 70 organisations and associations representing
gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people in South Africa." See Nat'l
Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, (1) SALR at 16-17.
The Commission was established under section 184 of the 1996 Constitution to
"promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights" and to
"promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights." S.
AFR. CONST. ch. 9, § 184.
56. The common law offense of sodomy was defined as "unlawful and
intentional sexual intercourse per anum between human males" whether
consensual or not. de Vos, supra note 20, at 18 (citing Jonathan Burkell &
John Milton, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 632 (2d ed. 1997)). The challenged
statutory provisions included the following sections:
[Section] 20A of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, which prohibited
acts 'calculated to stimulate passion or to give sexual gratification'
between two men 'at a party'; the provision in Schedule 1 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which refers to sodomy; and the
provision in the Schedule to the Security Officers Act 92 of 1987 that
refers to sodomy.
Id.
57. See Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v.Minister of Justice,
(1) SALR at 28.
58. de Vos, supra note 20, at 17. Justice Ackermann wrote the majority
judgment, with whom the rest of the Court concurred. Justice Sachs wrote a
separate concurring judgment. Justice Ackerman in turn agreed with Justice
Sachs's judgment, making it possible to treat the two judgments as one
judgment. Angelo Pantazis, How to DecriminaliseGay Sex: National Coalition
for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 15 S.AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS.
188, 188 (1999).

59. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, (1)
SALR at 23.
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attraction." 60 The Court acknowledged that homosexuals fit
the profile of a minority, similar to blacks, women, ethnic
groups, or religious minorities because they all experience
discrimination. 61 In other words, the Constitution seeks to
protect homosexuals not because they are different, but
because they are treated differently. 62 Under this analysis, the
Court did not pass judgment on homosexuality as a lifestyle,
but instead focused on the fact that homosexuals are a
vulnerable group that is constitutionally protected from
discrimination.
In applying the equality analysis, the Court went on to
determine whether sodomy differentiates between people or
classes of people, whether that differentiation amounts to
63
discrimination, and whether that discrimination is unfair.
The Court found differentiation when it compared the
proscribed conduct with conduct that is not illegal 64 and
determined that this differentiation was discriminatory
because it was based on sexual orientation. The Court devoted
the majority of the opinion to discussing why this
differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination towards
homosexuals. According to the Court, it is the impact of
discrimination on the members of the affected group that is the
65
determining factor regarding the unfairness of discrimination.
In finding the discrimination to be unfair, the Court pointed to
the psychological effect of the law on homosexuals as well as
66
the societal prejudice and stigma the law reinforced.
60. Id. at 25.
61. Pantazis, supra note 58, at 191.
62. Id. at 191-92.
63. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, (1)
SALR at 23-24.
64. Id. at 22. The sodomy laws prohibited sex between men, but there
were no laws prohibiting private sex between consenting adult females or
between a consenting adult male and an adult female. Id.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Pantazis, supra note 58, at 191. In finding the discrimination to be
unfair, the Court stated the following:
(a) The discrimination is on a specified ground. Gay men are a
permanent minority in society and have suffered in the past from
patterns of disadvantage. The impact is severe, affecting the dignity,
personhood and identity of gay men at a deep level. It occurs at many
levels and in many ways and is often difficult to eradicate.
(b) The nature of the power and its purpose is to criminalize private
conduct of consenting adults which causes no harm to anyone else. It
has no other purpose than to criminalise conduct which fails to
conform with the moral or religious views of a section of society.
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Once the Court determined that the sodomy laws did
constitute unfair discrimination, it then considered the
government's argument that the laws should be upheld
pursuant to the limitations clause. On one side, the Court
weighed the "severe" limitation of a gay man's right to equality,
privacy, dignity, and freedom. 67 On the other side, the Court
found no legitimate purpose or justification. 68 In addition, the
Court emphasized that "[t]he enforcement of the private moral
views of a section of the community, which are based to a large
extent on nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as ... a
'69
legitimate purpose.
The Court also found that the sodomy laws violated the
rights to human dignity and privacy. 70 The Court found that a
law that punishes a form of sexual conduct regardless of the
relationship of the couple violated the right to human dignity in
that it "degrades and devalues gay men in our broader
society."7 1
In finding the offense of sodomy to be
unconstitutional on the basis of the right to privacy, the Court
held that everyone has a right to private intimacy that allows
people to "establish and nurture human relationships without
interference from the outside community." 72 Justice Sachs
went on to declare that "[i]t is not for the state to choose or to
arrange the choice of [a] partner, but for the partners to choose
themselves. '73 The Court emphasized that the fact that the
sodomy laws violated the rights to equality, dignity, and
privacy "highlights just how egregious the invasion of the
constitutional rights of gay persons has been" in South Africa.7 4

(c)

The discrimination has..,

gravely affected

the rights and

interests of gay men and deeply impaired their fundamental dignity.
Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, (1)
SALR at 27.
67. Id. at 31. The Court considered how the harm from the sodomy laws
affects a gay man's ability to "achieve self-identification and self-fulfillment,"
fosters further discrimination in society, and prevents a "fair distribution of
social goods and services and the award of social opportunities for gays." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 28.
71.

Id. at 29.

72. Id. at 30.
73.

Id. at 61 (Sachs, J., concurring).

74. Id. at 30. In considering foreign law pursuant to section 39, Justice
Ackermann stated that "[t]here is nothing in the jurisprudence of other open

and democratic societies based on human dignity, equality and freedom which
would lead me to a different conclusion." Id. at 32.
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The Court did acknowledge that this issue "touch[es] on
deep convictions and evoke[s] strong emotions" 75 for many
South Africans, but took the view that "[t]here is no single,
superior perspective for judging questions of difference, of who
is normal and who is not and of which differences are morally
or ethically irrelevant and which ones are not."76 The Court
was unequivocal on this point holding that "what is
constitutionally normal is expanded to include the widest range
of perspectives and to acknowledge, accommodate and accept
the largest spread of difference. '77 The Court was careful not to
condemn people who held differing religious beliefs, but
affirmed the fact that "while the Constitution protects the right
of people to continue with such beliefs, it does not allow the
state to turn these beliefs-even in moderate or gentle
'78
versions-into dogma imposed on the whole of society.

B. THE IMMIGRATION CASE
The second case involving sexual orientation decided by the
Constitutional Court was National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs. 79 In that case,
the Constitutional Court affirmed a High Court holding that
section 25(5) of the immigration law was unconstitutional. 80
Section 25(5) facilitated the immigration into South Africa of
75. Id.
76. de Vos, supra note 20, at 21.
77. Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, (1)
SALR at 68.
78. Id. at 69.
79. 2000 (2) SALR 1 (CC). The Court stated the following:
The first applicant is a voluntary association of individual gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people in South Africa and of 69
organisations and associations representing such people. Its principal
objectives include the promotion of equality before the law for all
persons, irrespective of their sexual orientation; the reform and
repeal of laws that discriminate on the basis of such orientation; the
promotion and sponsoring of legislation to ensure equality and equal
treatment of people in respect of their sexual orientation; and to
challenge by means of litigation, lobbying, advocacy and political
mobilization all forms of discrimination on the basis of such
orientation. The second to seventh applicants, none of whom is a
South African citizen, are the 'same-sex life partners' of the eighth to
the 13th applicants respectively. The eighth to the 13th applicants
(the South African partners) are all permanently and lawfully
resident in South Africa. The 14th applicant is the Commission for
Gender Equality.
Id. at 16-17.
80. See id. at 10.
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the spouses of permanent South African residents, but did not
afford the same benefits to same-sex life partners of permanent
South African residents. 81
The Constitutional Court analyzed the constitutionality of
section 25(5) under the rights to equality and human dignity
simultaneously. 82
Following the approach laid down in
previous cases, including the Sodomy Case, the Court held that
the law differentiated between heterosexual married couples
and same-sex life partners in that it failed to extend the same
advantages or benefits to foreign same-sex partners that it
extended to spouses.8 3 Accordingly, the Court found that the
law differentiated between persons on the grounds of sexual
orientation and marital status, both of which are listed in the
equality provision, and therefore was presumed to constitute
84
discrimination.
The Court then sought to determine whether the discrimination was unfair. Again relying on previous cases, the Court
stated that the "determining factor regarding the unfairness of
discrimination is ...the impact of the discrimination on ...
the members of the affected group. ''8 5 In determining the
impact of section 25(5), the Court focused on the past and
continuing discrimination of gays and lesbians:
The denial of equal dignity and worth [to gays and lesbians] all too
quickly and insidiously degenerates into a denial of humanity and
leads to inhuman treatment by the rest of society in many ways. This
is deeply demeaning and frequently has the cruel effect of
undermining the confidence
and sense of self-worth and self-respect of
86
lesbians and gays.

The Court acknowledged that in other countries there has
been a change in societal and legal attitudes regarding family,
and that in countries such as Canada, Israel, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, there has been an increased
81. Id.
82. Id. at 23.
83. Id. at 23-24.
84. Id. at 26. The Court stated that
[tlhe prerequisite of marriage before the benefit is available points to
that element of the discrimination concerned with marital status,
while the fact that no such benefit is available to gays and lesbians
engaged in the only form of conjugal relationship open to them in
harmony with their sexual orientation represents discrimination on
the grounds of sexual orientation.
Id.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Id. at 28.
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understanding and sensitivity "towards human diversity in
general and to gays and lesbians and their relationships in
particular. '87 That said, the Court held that the impact of
section 25(5) was to reinforce "harmful and hurtful stereotypes
of gays and lesbians." 88 One such hurtful stereotype the Court
referred to was the tendency to grant heterosexual
relationships more importance due to the ability of couples in
those relationships to procreate. 89 The Court took issue with
defining conjugal relationships based on the ability to
procreate, finding it demeaning both to same-sex couples and to
heterosexual couples who are unable or unwilling to
procreate. 90 The Court went on to state that by reinforcing
existing prejudices and stereotypes, section 25(5) constituted a
"crass, blunt, cruel and serious" invasion of homosexuals'
dignity.9 1
In exploring these harmful stereotypes, the Court admitted
that "there is still no appropriate recognition in our law of the
same-sex life partnership, as a relationship, to meet the legal
and other needs of its partners." 92 The Court made it clear that
the complainants would have married each other if the law
permitted them to do so, 93 and dismissed the argument that the
immigration law did not discriminate against gays and lesbians
because they were free to marry someone of the opposite sex if
they so chose. 94 The Court stated that gays and lesbians have a
constitutional right "to express [their sexual] orientation in a
relationship of their own choosing," 95 and that section 25(5) is
unconstitutional because it denies benefits to gays and lesbians
who are in the only form of conjugal relationship that is in
96
"harmony with their sexual orientation."
In considering the limitation provision, the Court
concluded that there was no rational connection between the
exclusion of same-sex life partners from the benefits of section
25(5) and the government interest of protecting families and

87. Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 31.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 31-32.
91. Id. at 33.
92. Id. at 25.
93. Id. at 17.

94. Id. at 25.
95. Id. at 26.
96.

Id. at 25.
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the family life of heterosexual spouses. 97 Justice Ackermann
stated that "protecting the traditional institution of marriage
as recognized by law may not be done in a way which
unjustifiably limits the constitutional rights of partners in a
permanent same-sex life partnership." 98
Reframing the
argument put forth by the government that traditional families
must be protected, the Court stated that
"in some ways, the debate about family presents society with a false
choice.
It is possible to be pro-family without rejecting less
traditional family forms. It is not anti-family to support protection
for non-traditional families. The traditional family is not the only
family form and non-traditional
family forms may equally advance
99
true family values."
C. THE SPOUSAL BENEFITS CASE

In Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa,
the Constitutional Court confirmed a High Court order
declaring the Judges Remuneration and Conditions of Services
Act unconstitutional to the extent that the Act afforded benefits
to the spouses of judges but not to their same-sex life
partners. 10 0 The complainant was a judge who had been
involved in an "intimate, committed, exclusive and permanent
relationship since about 1986."101 The Court went on to state
that "[a]lthough not married.., they live in every respect as a
married couple and are acknowledged as such by their
10 2
respective families and friends."
The Court held that the Act violated the equality provision
of the Constitution because it provided benefits to spouses, but
not to same-sex partners. 10 3 In its analysis, the Court pointed
to its recognition of different forms of life partnerships in the
Immigration Case as well as to "woman-to-woman" marriages
in traditional African societies.10 4 In addition, the Court stated
97. Id. at 33-34.
98. Id. at 33.
99. Id. at 34 n.76 (quoting Canada [Attorney-Gen.] v. Mossop [1993] 100
D.L.R. (4) 658, 712).
100. Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, No. CCT 45/01 (CC
July 25, 2002), http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2002/satchwell.pdf. The
Act provides for the payment to the surviving spouse of a deceased judge twothirds of the salary that would have been payable to that judge as well as
other benefits. Id. T 7.
101. Id. T 4.
102. Id.
103. See id. 25.
104. Id. 12.
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that "families come in many shapes and sizes. The definition of
the family also changes as social practices and traditions
change. In recognizing the importance of the family, we must
take care not to entrench particular forms of family at the
expense of other forms." 10 5 Perhaps due to the strong holdings
in the Sodomy and Immigration Cases, the government did not
argue that the law should be upheld pursuant to the limitation
provision and conceded that "permanent same-sex life partners
are entitled to found their relationships in a manner which
accords with their sexual orientation and further that such
relationships ought not to be the subject of unfair
0 6
discrimination."'
In its analysis the Court continued to build on its previous
exposition of same-sex marriage when it stated that
[t]he benefits accorded to spouses of judges by the legislation are
accorded to them because of the importance of marriage in our society
and because judges owe a legal duty of support to their spouses. In
terms of our common law, marriage creates a physical, moral and
spiritual community of law that imposes reciprocal duties of
cohabitation and support. The formation of such relationships is a
matter of profound importance to the parties, and indeed to their
families and is of great social value and significance. However, as I
have indicated above, historically our law has only recognized
marriages between heterosexual spouses. This narrowness of focus
has excluded many relationships that create similar obligations and
have a similar social value.'17

III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDER THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
Marriage in South Africa is currently defined as the
"legally recognized life-long voluntary union between one man
and one woman to the exclusion of all other persons." 10 8 This
definition predates the new Constitution and does not reflect
the goals of the new South Africa. The common law ban on
homosexual marriage violates the equality provision of the
Constitution, as well as the Constitutional rights to human
dignity and privacy. In addition, there are no reasonable and
justifiable reasons, as required by the Constitution, for limiting
105.
106.
107.
108.
South

Id. 13 (citations omitted).
Id. 15.
Id. 22.
Pierre de Vos, Same-Sex Marriage, the Right to Equality and the
African Constitution, 11 S. AFR. PUB. L. 355, 361 (1996) (quoting

BARNARD ET AL., THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW 149

(3rd ed. 1994)).
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the right to marry only to heterosexual couples.
A. THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY
Based on the Court's jurisprudence under the Bill of Rights
and the strong precedents set forth by the Sodomy,
Immigration, and Spousal Benefits Cases, an analysis of samesex marriage under the equality provision is relatively
straightforward. The first step in the analysis requires a
determination that the law differentiates between people or
categories of people. 10 9 In the Immigration and Spousal
Benefits Cases, the Court found that the failure of the law to
extend the same benefits to same-sex partners that the law
extended to spouses constituted differentiation.' 10
The
opportunity to enter into a legal marriage allows its
participants to receive significant legal, economic, and social
benefits, 1 ' the denial of which constitutes an extraordinary
deprivation. 1 2 To deny these benefits specifically to gays and
109. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 83, 103 and accompanying text.
111. These benefits include: the right to make life and death decisions for
each other, Bradley Silver, 'Til Deportation Do Us Part: The Extension of
Spousal Recognition to Same-Sex Partnerships,12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS.
575, 575 (1996); the right to inheritance; to adopt or be foster parents; to
medical insurance coverage; to bring a wrongful death action; the right to
make life and death decisions for each other; and the right to inheritance.
Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, The Definitional Exclusion of Gays & Lesbians from
Family Status, 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 549, 556 (1996). In addition,
married couples receive private benefits, such as health insurance and
benefits packages from employers. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People
Should Seek the Right to Marry, in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D.
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 818, 819 (1997). Marriage also
includes significant social benefits. By marrying, heterosexual couples make a
public commitment and receive public recognition of that commitment.
Mosikatsana, supra, at 557. As described by the Immigration Case, marriage
"creates a physical, moral and spiritual community of life." Nat'l Coalition for
Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1, 29 (CC)
(quoting JUNE D. SINCLAIR & JACQUELINE HEWTON, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE

422 (1996)). This "community" is denied to homosexuals because they cannot
marry.
112. Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996,
at 19. Although some of the legal and financial benefits of marriage can be
achieved through alternative means, such as by will, contract, or power of
attorney, many of these benefits can only be realized through legally
recognized marriage. See Craig Lind, Sexual Orientation,Family Law and the
Transitional Constitution, 112 S. AFR. L.J. 481, 486 (1995). In addition, even
if a same-sex couple had the awareness and financial ability to make such
legal arrangements, they would still have legitimate concerns as to whether
such documents or contracts would survive legal challenges from extended
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lesbians, therefore, is to differentiate between people or
categories of people in violation of the equality provision of the
Constitution.
The second step in an equality analysis is to determine
13
whether this differentiation amounts to discrimination."
Similar to the Sodomy, Immigration, and Spousal Benefits
Cases, allowing heterosexual couples, but not same-sex couples,
to marry constitutes differentiation based on sexual
orientation.' 14 Because sexual orientation is a specified ground
5
listed in the equality provision, discrimination is presumed. 1
The next inquiry will be whether the discrimination is
unfair. 16 Discrimination based on a ground listed in the
equality provision is presumed to be unfair unless it is
established otherwise.' ' 7 Although this is the step in the
analysis that drew most of the Court's attention in the Sodomy
and Immigration Cases, those precedents and the government's
concession of unfairness in the Spousal Benefits Case should
simplify this step in a marriage case. In determining whether
discrimination is fair, the Court has focused on the goal of the
equality provision to prevent patterns of group disadvantage
that result from discrimination." 18 Using the substantive view
called for by the Constitution and used in the previous cases,
this analysis should not focus on a claim that homosexuals are
different, but that they have been treated differently.' 19 In
other words, the Court should continue to be unwilling to
discuss whether gays and lesbians should be homosexual or
whether they should get married. Instead, the focus should be
on the significant impact the marriage laws have
on
120
homosexuals and on society's treatment of homosexuals.
Marriage is society's most sacred and revered
institution.' 2 For many people, the day they get married is one
of the most important days in their lives, filled with

family or other interested parties, especially in the event of the death of one of
the partners. See Mosikatsana, supra note 111, at 557.
113. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 64, 83-84, 103 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

119.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

120.
121.

See supra notes 25-26, 65-66, 85 and accompanying text.
Stoddard, supra note 111, at 819.
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extraordinary meaning and symbolism. To deny homosexuals
the opportunity to participate in this fundamental institution is
to treat homosexual couples differently.
This different
treatment sends a message that gay relationships are somehow
less significant and less valuable than heterosexual
relationships. 22 The marriage laws unfairly deny significant
benefits to gays and lesbians and this denial demeans
homosexual relationships and fosters further discrimination of
homosexuals in society. In addition, the recognition of samesex marriage would serve to "normalize" lifelong homosexual
relationships. 2 3
This in turn would both stabilize the
relationships themselves and would "facilitate greater social
acceptance of same-sex relationships in general." 124 For these
reasons, the Court should find the discrimination to be unfair
and the ban on same-sex marriage to be a violation of the right
to equality.
B. THE RIGHTS TO HUMAN DIGNITY AND PRIVACY

The ban on same-sex marriage also violates the
fundamental rights to human dignity and privacy. It is
degrading and devaluing to homosexuals when the law
recognizes heterosexual marriage, but fails to recognize
homosexual marriage. It keeps homosexuals from conducting
their relationships with the same amount of social recognition
and human dignity as is afforded to heterosexuals. It says to
homosexuals that they, and their relationships, are inferior in
25
violation of the right to human dignity.1
The Court in the Sodomy Case also held that the right to
privacy grants everyone the right to "establish and nurture
human relationships without interference from the outside
community." 126 The right to privacy, therefore, not only
protects what happens behind closed doors, but also includes
individual decisions about one's personal life, even if they are
shared with the community. In this way, the right to privacy
grants homosexuals the right to choose their partner and to
have that partner recognized and acknowledged by the
122. Id.
123. de Vos, supra note 108, at 357.
124. Id. at 359; see also Mosikatsana, supra note 111, at 557 (discussing
the intangible benefits that arise from marriage).
125. See Brenda Grant, Homosexual Marriage and the Constitution, 12 S.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 568, 570-71 (1996).
126. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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community.
C. THE LIMITATIONS CLAUSE

Although the analysis under the rights to equality, human
dignity, and privacy favors same-sex marriage, the respondents
are allowed to try to save the limitation from
unconstitutionality by showing that the limitation is justifiable
and reasonable. 127 In arguing against the precedents created in
the Sodomy, Immigration, and Spousal Benefits Cases, the
government will find their strongest arguments not in the text
of the Constitution or the decisions of the previous cases, but in
the social framework of society and the traditional
understanding of marriage. In arguing that limiting the rights
to equality, dignity, and privacy is reasonable and justified
when it comes to same-sex marriage, the government may put
forward several arguments which could be defeated as follows.
1. Marriage Is Not by Definition Heterosexual
Advocates for same-sex marriage often are told that
marriage is by definition between a man and a woman. 128 This
statement actually puts forth a conclusion rather than an
argument. It is actually debatable whether marriage has
29
always been defined as between a man and a woman.
William N. Eskridge has compiled research from several
1 30
academic fields to document the history of same-sex unions.
He has evidence of the legal recognition of same-sex
relationships from all over the world dating from ancient Egypt
to modern day.' 3' This includes "woman marriages" in South,
West, and East Africa, 32 which were referred to by the Court in
33
the Spousal Benefits Case. 1
Still, even if marriage has not always been defined as
127. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
128. de Vos, supra note 108, at 364; see also Andrew Sullivan, State of the
Union, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 20 (noting that a common argument

against same-sex marriage is the historical definition of marriage as between
a man and a woman).
129. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-50
(1996); ANDREW SULLIVAN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 3-45 (1997).

130.
131.
132.
133.

ESKRIDGE, supra note 129, at 15-50.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Satchwell v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, No. CCT 45/01, 1

12 (CC July 25, 2002), http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2002/satchwell.
pdf.
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between one man and one woman, it is true that marriage has
been defined that way in South Africa and much of the world
for a very long time. This, however, does not mean that
marriage is inherently between a man and a woman. Marriage
is an institution that has been created by society and reflects
the values and attitudes of the society around it. 134 Marriage
does not have essential elements, but is actually dynamic and
changes with other institutions in society. 135 In other words,
there is no neutral definition of marriage.
This reality is evidenced by the fact that civil marriage has
undergone vast changes in South Africa and throughout the
world. 136 As author Andrew Sullivan notes, if marriage were
the same today as it has been for the past 2,000 years, it would
be possible to "marry a twelve-year-old you had never met, to
own a wife as property and dispose of her at will, or to imprison
a person who married someone of a different race." 137 As South
Africa's Apartheid history proves, a "long historical pedigree
does not establish the legitimacy of a state definition or
policy."1 38 Just as the antimiscegenation laws reflected the
racist beliefs of Apartheid South Africa, when those racist
beliefs changed, the marriage laws changed with them. The
Court in the Spousal Benefits Case addressed this exact issue
when it stated that "[t]he definition of the family... changes as
social practices and traditions change." 139 The fact that South
African law prohibits same-sex marriage is a reflection of
society's past persecution of homosexuals. As evidenced by the
Constitution and the cases previously discussed, South Africa
has moved away from its past oppression of homosexuals.
Accordingly, South Africa should change its marriage laws to
reflect this larger change.

134. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1419, 1434 (1993) (citing E.R. LEACH, RETHINKING ANTHROPOLOGY 105
(1961)). According to anthropologist Edmund R. Leach, marriage can only be
defined as one or more of the following: "(1) the rights and duties inhering in
spousedom, (2) the personal relationship between people considered spouses,
and/or (3) relationships and alliances created or cemented by espousal." Id.
All of these definitions could, and based on Professor Eskridge's research,
arguably have included same-sex couples.
135. See de Vos, supra note 108, at 371.

136. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.
137.

Id.

138.

MARK

STRASSER,

LEGALLY WED:

SAME-SEX

CONSTITUTION 6 (1997).
139. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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2. Same-Sex Marriage Does Not Violate Religious Tenets
Another possible argument as to why the ban on same-sex
marriage is justifiable is that same-sex marriage violates
religious tenets. 140 This argument, however, fails to recognize
that religion does not govern civil marriage. 14 1 Just as civil law
allows divorce even though some churches forbid it, so too could
civil law allow same-sex marriage while some churches forbid
it.142 When the Court faced a similar religious challenge in the
Sodomy Case, it held that religious beliefs could not be imposed
on all of society, nor could religious doctrine dictate
constitutional protections. 143 State recognition of same-sex
marriage would not require faith communities to change their
44
definitions of marriage. 1
3. Marriage Is Not Only for Procreation
A third justification often put forth for banning same-sex
marriage is based on procreation. 45 That is, marriage, being
primarily about procreation, should be reserved for
heterosexual couples. 146 This argument should fail, however,
because the "physical ability to procreate has never been a
requirement for marriage." 14 7 Civil marriage is granted to
"childless couples, sterile couples, couples who marry too late in
life to have children, [and] couples who adopt other people's
children." 4 8
No one would make the argument that
heterosexual couples that are unable to procreate, because of
sterility, impotence, or age, should not be able to marry because
the primary purpose of marriage cannot be met. 149 In the
140.
141.
142.
143.

de Vos, supra note 108, at 364.
See Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.
Id.
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.

144.
145.

Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.
de Vos, supra note 108, at 365; see Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.

146.

Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.

147. Pamela S. Katz, The Case for Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 61, 99 (1999).
148. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20. See also Rauch, supra note 112, at 22
stating that
[i]f the possibility of children is what gives meaning to marriage, then
a post-menopausal woman who applies for a marriage license should
be turned away at the courthouse door. What's more, she should be
hooted at and condemned for stretching the meaning of marriage

beyond its natural basis and so reducing the institution to frivolity.

Id.
149.

Grant, supra note 125, at 569.
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Immigration Case, the Court was unwilling to view procreative
potential as a justification for marriage.1 50 The Court held that
such a view would demean marriages between couples that
chose not to or were unable to have children. 151 In the Sodomy
Case, Justice Ackermann acknowledged that some people
sincerely believe that sexual expression should be limited to
marriage with procreation as the sole purpose, but while
respecting that belief, the Court held that this belief could not
"influence what the Constitution dictates in regard to
152
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation."
4. Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage Would Not Weaken the
Institution of Marriage
A fourth justification that could be put forth is that
recognizing same-sex marriage would weaken the institution of
marriage as a whole. 15 3 This argument operates under the
assumption that the value of heterosexual marriage is
dependent upon the deprivation of that right to certain groups
of people in society. 54 This argument should fail because
"secur[ing] the rights of a majority by eviscerating the rights of
a minority is the opposite of what a liberal democracy is
supposed to be about." 55 Indeed, to assert that granting a gay
couple the right to marry would weaken a straight couple's
commitment to marriage implies that homosexuals are so
"inherently depraved and immoral" that to allow them to marry
would "inevitably spoil, even defame, the institution of
marriage." 156 This argument is contrary to the Court's goal of
condemning stereotypes. The Court held in the Sodomy Case
that there is no single or superior perspective for judging who
is normal. 157 In addition, the Court stated in the Immigration
Case that protecting the traditional institution of marriage
could not be done in a way that limits the constitutional rights

150.
151.
152.

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999

(1) SALR 6, 32 (CC).
153. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 21; see also de Vos, supra note 108, at 364
(refuting definitional and moral arguments against same-sex marriage).
154. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.
155. Id. at 21.
156. Id.

157.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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of same-sex life partners. 158 The argument that heterosexual
marriage is "normal" and allowing gays to marry would
somehow weaken marriage is, therefore, not a reasonable
justification.
5. Gays and Lesbians Are Not "Free" to Marry Someone of the
Opposite Sex
Another argument often used to support the ban on samesex marriage is that gays and lesbians are not discriminated
against because they are not prohibited from marrying
someone of the opposite sex.1 59 The Court dismissed this
argument in the Immigration Case when it held that gays and
lesbians have a right to express themselves in a relationship
that is in "harmony with their sexual orientation." 160 The
Sodomy Case recognized that sexual orientation is a part of a
homosexual's personhood and not something that can be
fragmented.' 6' Justice Sachs declared that the state cannot
arrange for someone's partner, but instead that partners have
62
the right to choose themselves.
The rights being limited by the ban on same-sex marriage
are the rights to equality, dignity, and privacy. These rights
are fundamental to the Constitution and, in the case of equality
and dignity, "are important rights going to the core of South
Africa's constitutional democratic values." 163 The justifications
discussed on behalf of the ban are not reasonable under the
new Constitution. 64 They are rooted in outdated conceptions of
158. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Sullivan, supra
note 128, at 21.
159. de Vos, supra note 108, at 366.
160. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
161. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999
(1) SALR 6, 27 (CC) (noting that discrimination against gay men has a severe
impact on their dignity, personhood, and identity).

162. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
163. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home
Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1, 34 (CC).

164. See, e.g., Lind, supra note 112, at 495. Lind writes,
While South Africa did not have a constitutional requirement of equal
treatment, arguments based on equality would have encountered
opposition based on a tradition of legal and social repugnance towards
homosexual conduct. But arguments of that nature are no longer

feasible.

Our Constitution interrupts our tradition of prejudice to

create an atmosphere of respect for difference within our society.

That respect

entitles

homosexuals

to the

same

rights

that

heterosexuals enjoy through their ability to enter legally accepted
domestic relationships.
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family and procreation that are no longer valid or true. In
addition, these arguments are not justifiable in an open and
democratic society because they focus on stereotypes and result
in prejudice towards a vulnerable group. 165 The Constitutional
Court has already rejected these arguments in previous cases
for just these reasons. The Court stated in the Sodomy Case
that although the Constitution cannot destroy homophobic
prejudice, it can require the "elimination of public institutions
which are based on and perpetuate such prejudice." 166 In
addition, the Court held that enforcing the moral views of even
a majority of the community cannot qualify as a legitimate
167
purpose if those views are based on prejudice.
D. INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW
Pursuant to section 39 of the Constitution, the Court is
required to look at international law when determining
whether the common law ban on same-sex marriage violates
the Constitution.1 68 Although the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the other principal human rights
instruments drafted by the United Nations do not explicitly
mention sexual orientation or same-sex marriage, they have
created a comprehensive body of human rights law that
protects all people. 169 These documents set out general
Id. (citations omitted).
165. See id. at 499. Lind writes,
Prime amongst the factors to which other national courts have looked
in deciding whether or not a restriction on freedom is "justifiable in
an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality" is the
respect which democratic societies have for the "inherent dignity of
the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society." Democratic societies balance the wishes of
individuals against the greater good of society by acknowledging "the
importance of the individual, and the undesirability of restricting his
or her freedom."

In following these approaches, a South African court should be
loath to restrict the right of homosexuals to enjoy the family rights
which heterosexuals have, with little interference, enjoyed for
centuries.
Id. (citations omitted).
166. See Nat'l Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice,
(1) SALR at 66-67.
167. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
169. Dr. Biong Deng, Human Rights of Gays and Lesbians and the United

Nations, Address Before the Facing the Mask Workshop (Nov. 29, 2001),
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protections that are significant to gays and lesbians including
freedom from discrimination, the right to privacy, the right to
170
equality under the law, and the right to security of person.
In addition, the Immigration Case acknowledged that there is
an international trend towards a redefinition of family that
includes an increased understanding and sensitivity "towards
human diversity in general and to gays and lesbians and their
17 1
relationships in particular."
Section 39 of the Constitution also states that the Court
may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of
Rights. 172 The Netherlands was the first country to grant gays
and lesbians the same marriage benefits granted to
heterosexual couples. 173 Several countries, however, have
granted homosexual relationships status akin to marriage,
including Germany, Australia, France, Sweden, Norway,
Hungary, Brazil, 174 Portugal,' 75 Denmark, Greenland, and

available at
http://www.mask.org.za/sections/AfricaPerCountry/southern
africa/un/htm.un/ (on file with author).
170. Id., http://www.mask.org.gov/sections/AfricaPerCountry/southernafric
a/un/htm.un/ (on file with author); see also Laurence R. Helfner, Will the
United Nations Human Rights Committee Require Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages?,in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 734 (noting
the United Nations Human Rights Committee's unanimous conclusion that an
Australian ban on same-sex consensual sodomy violated the privacy and
nondiscrimination rights outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights); Kristen L. Walker, United Nations Human Rights Law and
Same-Sex Relationships: Where to from Here?, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 743-57 (describing the potential use of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in arguing for gay and lesbian rights).
171. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home
Affairs, 2000 (2) SALR 1, 30-31 (CC).
172. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
173. Press Release, Lambda Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Netherlands Ends
Discrimination in Civil Marriages: Gays to Wed (Mar. 30, 2001), at http:/!
www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=814
[hereinafter
Lambda Press Release].
174. Michael Anders, Revolutionary First Gay "Marriages"Take Place in
Germany, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE., Aug. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL
24982235 (listing nations recognizing domestic partnership).
175. International Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships, Marriage Project
Fact Sheet (Lambda Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 30,
2001, at http://www.lambalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=432
[hereinafter International Recognition].
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Iceland.176 In addition, courts have recognized the "marital
nature" of committed homosexual relationships in Columbia,
Hungary, Israel, and Namibia. 177 In the United States, the
Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage benefits and protections violated the
state Constitution. 178 Most recently, the Ontario Superior
Court held that Canada's refusal to legally recognize same-sex
marriages was unconstitutional and gave the federal
Parliament two years to redefine the term marriage in the
Canadian law.179 Similar to the Sodomy Case, the Court should
again find that "[t]here is nothing in the jurisprudence of other
open and democratic societies based on human dignity,
equality, and freedom which would lead [the Court] to a
80
different conclusion."

E. CIVIL UNIONS
Due to the strong constitutional and precedential
arguments against limiting the right to marry only to
heterosexual couples, the government may adopt a different
strategy in opposing the recognition of same-sex marriage.
Instead of arguing that the Constitution does not require
recognizing same-sex marriage, the government might concede
that South Africa must legally recognize same-sex
relationships, but argue that rather than calling them
"marriages," the Court should create a legal classification such
as domestic partnership or civil union. This classification

176.

Lambda Press Release, supra note 173, at http://www.lambdalegal.org

/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=814.

Several other countries are

considering recognition of same-sex partnerships including Switzerland,
Spain, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic.
International Recognition, supra note 175, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=432;
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step
Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV, 641, 663-70 (2000)
(listing a country-by-country survey of laws relating to sexual minorities).
177. Lambda Press Release, supra note 173, at http://www.lambdalegal.org
/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=814.
178. Mark E. Wojcik et al., InternationalHuman Rights, 34 INT'L LAW.
761, 778 (2000).
179. Ontario Court Orders Government to Recognize Gay, Lesbian
Marriages, STAR TRIB., July 13, 2002, at A8. The government is expected to
appeal the ruling, and it is anticipated that Canada's Supreme Court will hear

the case in the end. Id.
180. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999
(1) SALR 6, 32 (CC).
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would confer on homosexuals all the same legal benefits as
marriage, but would exist under a different name. 181
It is true that in many ways, marriage actually includes
two institutions. 182 One is legal and involves specific legal
consequences, responsibilities, and privileges; the other is
moral and involves religious and social validation. Perhaps it
would be better if the moral and religious institution were
called marriage and the legal counterpart, domestic
partnership. 183 Although stripping religious marriages of any
civil recognition for both heterosexual and homosexual couples
would provide a "neutral" solution, it is very unlikely to occur
because marriage is such an established and socially
entrenched institution. Instead, the Court will have to consider
whether it would be constitutional to create a separate
institution just for homosexuals.
The South African Constitution calls for the elimination of
discrimination on practically all levels. The equality provision,
in particular, reflects this goal. The equality provision, "is the
legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle which created a serious
commitment to the elimination of discrimination on any
basis." 184 Marriage is a powerful institution that confers on its
181. Pierre de Vos, Associate Professor of Law at the University of the
Western Cape, hypothesized that the government may use just such a
strategy:
The argument that will be made by the government.., would not be
to say that [same-sex partnerships are an] abomination, but to say,
yes, one must accommodate same-sex couples and therefore there
must be some sort of partnership regulation or law. There must be
something, but obviously not marriage.
Interview with Pierre de Vos, Associate Professor of Law, University of the
Western Cape, in Bellville, South Africa (July 19, 2001), at 2 (transcript on file
with author).
182. See Lind, supra note 112, at 484-85.
183. Id. Ananda Louw, a researcher at the South African Law Commission
agrees:
Sometimes I think what one should do in South Africa is just to
deregulate marriage and make it a completely personal situation that
you do according to ... your own religion,... completely separated
from the state because of the fact that there are so many different
religions and cultures and so forth. It's [a] very difficult thing to
define what we're talking about. It's very difficult to find one way
that would be acceptable.
Interview with Ananda Louw, Researcher, South African Law Commission, in
Pretoria, South Africa (July 24, 2001), at 5 (transcript on file with author).
184. Joe Patrick Bean, South Africa Pioneers Protection of Gay Rights, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Mar. 13, 1997, available at 1997 WL 3164736
(quoting the National Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Equality).
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participants a complex web of rights and benefits, both legal
and social. The social context of marriage is a large part of
what gives it a privileged status. 85 To grant gays and lesbians
the legal rights, but not the social status, would be to deny
them substantive equality.1 8 6 To concede that same-sex couples
have a right to the legal benefits of marriage, but then withhold
the name and thereby the social benefits of marriage, would be
to engage in an "act of pure stigmatization." 87 Justice Yacoob
of the Constitutional Court points to just such a possibility:
If you are to recognize the dignity of human beings, and if the dignity
of a human being is to take into account what that human being is,
surely it's an affront to the dignity of the human being who has a
homosexual ... orientation to say that their relationship188
is worth less
than the relationship of couples who are different sexes.

Just as creating a separate institution for marriages
between black couples would have been unconstitutional, it
would be unconstitutional to allow heterosexual couples to
marry, but allow homosexual couples only access to civil
unions.
As long as legal marriages are recognized for
heterosexual couples, then the creation of a civil union for
same-sex couples would be unconstitutional in South Africa.
CONCLUSION
The South African Constitution is unlike any other in the
world in terms of its inclusion of sexual orientation. The
Constitutional Court has taken a clear position in interpreting
the Bill of Rights and implementing its goal of protecting
individuals and groups from discrimination. The Sodomy,
Immigration, and Spousal Benefits Cases demonstrate that the
Constitutional Court recognizes that homosexuals have a
Constitutional right to equality, human dignity, and privacy,
and that the Court is willing to protect gays and lesbians from
discrimination and social prejudice.
South Africa has already learned that separate but equal
"was a failed and pernicious policy with regard to race; it will
be a failed and pernicious policy with regard to sexual
185. Ronald Louw, Gay and Lesbian Partner Immigration and the
Redefining of Family: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Home Affairs, 16 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 313, 322 (2000).
186. Id. at 321.
187. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 20.
188. Interview with Zakeria Mohammed Yacoob, Justice, South African
Constitutional Court, in Cape Town, South Africa (July 18, 2001), at 2
(transcript on file with author).
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orientation" as well.' 8 9 Prohibitions against same-sex marriage
preserve, and even foster, the subordination of homosexuals in
South African society.
When the state refuses to treat
homosexuals equally under the law, it perpetuates the
perception of gays as immoral, deviant, and unworthy. As
Justice Ackermann so simply, yet strongly, articulated in the
Sodomy Case, "Like justice, equality delayed is equality
denied." 190 In many ways, admission to the institution of
marriage-both in name and function-may constitute the
most important test for determining the extent to which gays
and lesbians will be treated equally in South Africa. The only
acceptable solution under the new Constitution is to extend
gays and lesbians the right to marry. Anything less, would be
unconstitutional.

189. Sullivan, supra note 128, at 18.
190. Nat'l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1999
(1) SALR 6, 39 (CC).

